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LEGISLATION NOTES
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-A SURVEY OF MENTAL CRUELTY
AS A GROUND FOR DIVORCE
The past two generations have clearly indicated that the United States
is a world leader in many fields, including the subject of this note. With
414,000 divorces in 1961,1 the U.S. leads the world by an unfortunately
high margin. At that rate, over 1,100 marriages are dissolved each day,
seven days a week. Per 100,000 population, the United States' state courts
divorce two times as many couples as Denmark, Sweden, and Austria;
three times as many as England, France, and Australia; and four times as
many as Belgium.2 From the beginning of this century, the divorce rate
has multiplied more than three times, from 55,751, or .7 per thousand
persons in 1900,3 to 414,000, or 2.3 per thousand in 1961. 4
With such a tremendous growth in the divorce rate, and amidst ques-
tions and controversy placing the blame on a sundry of different causes,
Representatives Leo F. O'Brien and Howard R. Slater introduced House
Bill 1919 before the Seventy-fourth Illinois General Assembly on May 25,
1965. This bill proposed to make mental cruelty a ground for divorce.
Within two weeks, H.B. 1919 was tabled by the Committee on Judiciary,5
thus again becoming a victim of the technique used to destroy an unwanted
bill. Representative O'Brien indicated that the main concern and opposi-
tion to this type of legislation comes primarily from church groups and
others who are opposed to divorce in general, and to broadening the
grounds in particular, for fear of further increasing divorce rates.6 Wheth-
er these opponents have a valid argument remains a question which it is
the purpose of this note to answer.
The divorce statutes of the fifty-one jurisdictions in the United States,
as they concern cruelty, can be divided into four categories. First, there
are the states that specifically include mental cruelty as a ground for
divorce. Secondly, there are the states which provide for cruelty gener-
1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES, 64 (85th ed. 1964).
2 HAVERMANN, MEN, WOMEN AND MARRIAGE, 117 (1963).
3JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 90 (1959).
4 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, s-upra note 1.
5 74TH ILL. GEN. Assy, H.R. DAILY JOUR. No. 77 (June 9, 1965).
6 Letter from Leo F. O'Brien, Representative to the Illinois General Assembly, to
Donald Schiller, August 24, 1965, on file with DePaul Law Review.
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ally, and their courts interpret this to include mental as well physical
cruelty. Next there are those states, of which Illinois is a prominent mem-
ber, which have a general provision for cruelty, but whose courts interpret
this to mean only physical cruelty. Finally, there are those states which
have no provision for cruelty as a ground for divorce.
The forty jurisdictions having mental cruelty, whether expressly in
their statute or by court interpretation of the word cruelty, have an
average divorce rate of 3.11 per one thousand population,8 as opposed to
the eleven states having no provision for mental cruelty,9 which have an
average rate of 1.90 per one thousand population.10
At first glance, those fighting to contain the divorce rate seem to have
a strong argument against mental cruelty. However, statistics may be
quite misleading, which makes it necessary to study these states," their
statutes, and their divorce rates more carefully.
MENTAL CRUELTY JURISDICTIONS
At present, twenty-six jurisdictions have express provisions for mental
cruelty, or a generally accepted comparable ground.12 North Dakota's
7 ALASKA STAT. S 09.55.110 (1962), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1956), ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-1202 (1962), CAL. CIV. 5 92, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 46-13 (1958), COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. S 46-1-1 (1953), D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-403 (1961), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65.04
(1941), GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102 (Supp. 1963), HAWAII REV. LAWS § 324-20 (supp.
1963), IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-603.05 (1963), IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1201 (1946), IOWA
CODE §§ 598.8, 598.9 (Supp. 1964), KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1501 (Supp. 1961), Ky.
REV. STAT. § 403-020 (1962), LA. CIV. CODE ANN., arts. 138 & 139 (West 1952), ME.
REV. STAT. ANN., ch. 19, S 691 (1964), MINN. STAT. ANN. S 518.06 (Supp. 1964), Miss.
CODE ANN. § 2735 (1956), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.010 (1949), MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
S 21-103 (1947), NEB. REV. STAT. S 42-302 (1960), NEV. REV. STAT. S 125.010 (Supp. 1963),
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7 (1955), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 22-2A-34-2 (1952); N.M. STAT.
ANN. S 22-7-1 (1953), N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-031 (Supp. 1965), OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3105.01 (Page, 1953), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 51271 (1951), ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.030
(1963), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1955), R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-2 (1956), S.D.
CODE 14-0703 (Supp. 1960), TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4629 (1925), UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-3-1 (Supp. 1965), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1959), WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.08.020 (1961), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4704 (1961), Wis. STAT. § 247.07 (Supp.
1965), Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-38 (1957).
8 Computed from STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF U.S. 64, supra note 1.
9 ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 22 (1958), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522 (1953), ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, § 1 (1963), MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (1957), MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 1
(1955), MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 25.86 (1957), N.Y. DOM. REL. § 170, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5
(1950), S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101 (1962) and CONST. art. 17, § 3, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
801 (1956), VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Supp. 1964).
10 Computed from STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF U.S. 64, supra note 1.
11 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, supra note 7.
12 For example, Arkansas, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin ex-
press it as personal indignities, supra note 7. Various judicial interpretations seem to
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statute is a representative example of an express cruelty jurisdiction:
Divorces may be granted for any of the following causes: . . . second, Ex-
treme cruelty. Extreme cruelty is the infliction by one party to the marriage
of a grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering upon the other.13
The divorce rate of this group of states is 2.75 divorces per one thou-
sand population.14 This is nearly one half a point higher than the previ-
ously mentioned national rate of 2.3. However, included in this group
is Idaho, with a divorce rate of 3.9 per one thousand population.15 Idaho
has a residence requirement of only six weeks, 16 and this obviously invites
transient divorces from other states with strict divorce requirements.
Hence, Idaho's divorce rate for actual residents is unrealistic. Further-
more, Alaska, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, whose average divorce rate
is 3.92 per thousand population,'17 have a ground peculiar only to these
states-incompatibility.'8 The Supreme Court of New Mexico, in Hines
vs. Hines,19 has held that parties are incompatible where it was apparent
"that by reason of a total variance in taste, disposition, ambitions, mental
attitudes and ideas of husband and wife, that they were unable to live
together in peace .... ,,20 This added ground admittedly would have the
effect of increasing the divorce rate of these jurisdictions. For the sake of
a realistic comparison, it is necessary to eliminate the above four states
from this group. Consequently, the remaining states having express mental
cruelty statutes are more representative of the effect of such a provision,
and they have an average divorce rate of 2.51 per one thousand population.
21
Thirteen states22 and the District of Columbia23 have a provision for
"cruelty" in their statute, and their courts have construed it to include
merge indignities with cruelty as indicated in Lockhort v. Lockhort, 271 S.W.2d 208
(Mo. App. 1954), wherein the court stated that evidence as to numerous acts of marital
dereliction was sufficient to establish mental cruelty and sustain judgment granting the
hubsand a divorce on the ground of general indignities.
13N.D. CENT. CODE, supra note 7.
14 Computed from STATiscIAL ABSrMAcr OF U.S. 64, supra note 1.
15 Ibid. 16 IDAHO CODE ANN., supra note 7.
17Computed from STATISTCAL ABSTRACr OF U.S. 64, supra note 1.
18 ALASKA CODE CIVIL PROcEED., N.M. STAT. ANN., OKrA. STAT. ANN., supra note 7.
19 64 N.M. 377, 328 P.2d 944 (1958).
201 d. at 378, 328 P.2d at 946.
21 Computed from STATIsTCAL ABSTRACT OF U. S. 64, supra note 1.
22 California, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and Vermont, supra note 7.
23 The District of Columbia and the state of Louisiana provide for cruelty only as a
ground for limited divorce, but after a statutory period under the limited decree the
innocent party may gain an absolute divorce, see D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 16-403
(1961) and LA. Civ. CODE, art. 138 & 139 (1952).
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mental as well as physical cruelty.2 4 The total divorce rate of this group
is 3.72 per one thousand population, 25 which is nearly a point and a half
above the national average. As in the express mental cruelty group,
peculiarities which tend to distort the true meanings of the average must
be eliminated. The state of Nevada is included in this group, and it alone
has a rate of 25.9 per one thousand population.2 6 However, Nevada has
a six-week residence requirement for the purpose of filing for a divorce, 27
and due to a favorable climate and comfortable surroundings, Nevada
is well known as the transient divorce capital of this country. For this
reason this divorce rate does not express the true rate of divorce of actual
residents in the state. This necessitates isolating Nevada from the rest of
the group. With Nevada removed from this group of states, the average
divorce rate is 2.02 per one thousand population, which is 0.28 below the
national divorce average. 28
Hence, the average divorce rates of the two categories of states which
allow mental cruelty as a ground for divorce is 2.32 divorces per one
thousand population, which is 0.02 above the national average.
JURISDICTIONS WITHOUT MENTAL CRUELTY
As previously mentioned, there are eleven states which do not allow
divorces grounded in mental cruelty.29 With an average divorce rate of
1.90 per one thousand population, this group seems to justify the claim
that mental cruelty has the effect of increasing divorce rates. However,
a closer analysis reveals that there are two separable classifications within
this group: those which interpret cruelty to mean only physical cruelty,-10
and those which contain no provision for divorce on grounds of cruelty.31
The average divorce rate for the former category is 2.32 per one thou-
sand population.3 2 Surprisingly, this is the same rate as that computed
24 Grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering are the ultimate facts from
which the conclusion of law is to be drawn that extreme cruelty exists as a grounds
for divorce, Lucech v. Lucech 172 P.2d 73, 75, Cal. App. 2d 890 (1946). While the
Illinois statute, infra note 30, contains similar language, the courts have given a narrow
meaning to the phrase "extreme cruelty."
25 Computed from STATISTICAL ABsmAcr OF U.S. 64, supra note 1.
20 Ibid. 28 Ibid.
27 Ibid. 29 Supra note 9.
30 ALA. CODE tit. 34, S 22 (1958), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, S 1522 (1964), ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 40, § 1 (1963), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 1 (1963), S.C. CONST. art. 17, § 3; S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-101 (1962). The Supreme Court of South Carolina held physical
cruelty, as used in divorce law, has been defined as actual physical violence, Brown v.
Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330 (1949).
31 Maryland, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, supra
note 9.
32 Computed from figures in STATISTICAL ARSTRACT OF U.S. 64, supra note 1.
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for the states which allow divorces based on mental cruelty. Those states
which do not have provisions for absolute divorce for physical cruelty
have an average divorce rate of 1.67 divorces per one thousand popula-
tion,38 which is well below the national average. This low figure may
partly be accounted for by the high rate of transient divorces in states
like Nevada and Idaho. Thus, the lack of cruelty in divorce laws is not
necessarily a deterrent to divorce.
CONCLUSION
Illinois House Bill 1919, as well as many other attempts to broaden
Illinois' divorce statute to include mental cruelty, have failed mainly be-
cause of charges that it would encourage more divorces. Surveys and sta-
tistics, however, show that the rate of divorce is not really affected by
the existence, or non-existence of mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
Statistics further demonstrate the best way to reduce divorce rates in
Illinois is to abolish cruelty entirely. This would indeed lower the rate of
divorce in Illinois, but it would not solve the problem. Illinois' wealthier
residents would travel to other states to secure a divorce, and collusion
and fraud would increasingly be perpetrated on Illinois courts. Collusion
has been defined as a corrupt agreement between the parties to impose
a case upon the court, either by the suppression or manufacture of evi-
dence, or by an agreement that no defense shall be made.3 4 Despite the
continued recognition of the states' interest in marriage, there is little fer-
ment today to provide efficient machinery to prevent collusive divorces. 35
Illinois, by providing for cruelty in its divorce statute, demonstrates a
public policy in favor of granting the maritally innocent spouse a divorce
when cruelty has been inflicted on him.36 The standards used in finding
cruelty, whether physical or mental, are generally the same T Modern
medical science has proven mental pain and suffering may be as great or
greater than its physical counterpart.38 The Supreme Court of Illinois has
also affirmed this fact in its 1961 decision making mental distress a cause
of action in tort, stating "[wle conclude that peace of mind is an interest
of sufficient importance to receive protection from the law, against in-
33 Ibid.
3 4 Neu v. Neu, 297 Mich. 654, 298 N.W. 318 (1941).
35 RYAN AND GRANFIELD, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 311, supra note 5 (1963).
3 6 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, S 1 (1963).
37 What constitutes extreme cruelty (physical or mental) depends on the tempera-
ment, the culture, and other attributes of the individual. What is extreme cruelty to
a Christian might not be to a pagan. Diem v. Diem 141 Fla. 260 (1935), as cited in
Greisen v. Greisen 146 Fla. 94, 200 So. 523 (1941).
38 Interview with various psychiatrists in Chicago, Illinois Aug. 14, 1965.
